Panel 3 Respondent – Carolyn Marvin

Prof. Marvin thanks the panelists for a fascinating and informative set of presentations by the panelists, and the innovative tools and research methods to analyze aspects of the Chinese internet.

She wants to step back from the speech zones or Golden Shield, and look at a more civilizational level to understand the implications of these discussions.  While the presentations represent only a fraction of the papers, they signify important issues concerning political will to expand digitization plays in Chinese societies.  The presentations also point us to the dynamism of the technological sphere, and the importance of creating metaphors and meaningful theoretical frameworks to understand the future flow of information and communication. Continue reading

3.4 Dave LYONS: China’s Golden Shield Project: Myths, Realities and Context

Lyons will examine not the role of police (versus companies) in censorship material in China.  The Golden Shield Project began in its exploratory phase around 1998, and has been called by many as “the great firewall.”  

Lyons’s point is that the Golden Shield Project (GSP) is not the Great Firewall.  His interest is in the development of technology in bureaucratic processes; applied here, he examines Jon Agar’s The Government Machine to study what computers and IT do as a tool of government. 

The Golden Shield is a project conducted from roughly 1998-2008 to bring computers to the police at all levels of security in China.  Many of the roles of the computer were not related to the internet (e.g. population management).  The idea in the population management area was to have a national database record for every single Chinese individual in the system, by registering individuals at the local, then provincial, then national level, with corresponding less degree of granularity.  The 1st-generation card, launched in the 1980s, sometimes had names written by hand; the 2nd-generation ID card is now digitized with RFID chips to be more secure.

Lyons specifically focuses on forgery, which has been a serious problem in China.  Forgers readily and publicly advertise their services.  The largest project of GSP has a lot to do with how to accurately identify citizens.  It will help in tracking dissidents who are targeted, but the forgery industry is so robust that when forgers become hackers, the government may find no small amount of resistance.

Another project of GSP is building surveillance technologies through computer technologies; given that other countries have similar surveillance technologies, Lyons sees China as having caught up in aggregating data for surveillance and security purposes.  China has been a decade behind other countries in police computing, but it is catching up quickly.

3.3 Rebecca MACKINNON: China’s Censorship 2.0

MacKinnon will examine one particular type of censorship in China.

Censorship in China is usually categorized in two ways: (1) censorship outside the “great firewall” – filtering of websites outside of China; (2) censorship inside the “great firewall” – deletion of content on domestic or commercial sites; takedown of domestically hosted sites; shut-down of data centers.  Circumvention tools that Hal and Ethan just discussed mainly address the former type of censorship.  

The difficulty, however, comes with the latter type–when internal sites and servers are shut down.  MacKinnon’s work looks at this type of censorship. Research of censorship inside the great firewall is slim; a 2006 study (with MacKinnon) compared which search engine seemed to be removing more or fewer results, and discovered a surprising variety.  Search engines were not uniformly censoring in the same way, for the same things–indicating the companies were making internal decisions in reaction to government demands, implementing those demands differently.  Nart Villeneuve at The University of Toronto followed up on this study, studying search engine transparency in China. 

The study: Given the wide variety of how search engines censored search results, she and her co-researchers hypothesized that blogging services would show a similar variance in their censorship decisions.  The study posted content that ranged in sensitivity across 15 different blog services.  

Results of study: Censorship varied even more than expected in the blogosphere.  A great deal of sensitive content was getting through, but at vary different amounts depending on blogging services.  The company with the highest censoring practices censored 60 out of 108 blog posts; the least censoring service only censored one.  

The results also revealed different types of censorship behavior: (1) The blogger is prevented from posting at all; (2) post is “held for moderation” (in which case it sometimes would and sometimes wouldn’t appear); (3) post is not visible to public, but only to the author when logged in; (4) published, but then removed within 24 hours; and (5) geo-filtering of sensitive posts (MSN only). 

However, very sensitive posts sometimes would get through; yet news agency articles that included names of leaders (e.g. Hu Jintau pep talk to Olympic athletes) would be censored.  Why the variation?  Potential theories: relationship of local city, provincial, or state officials with blog editors; different methods for implementation. 

Conclusions. Domestic censorship is not centralized–it is often outsourced by the government to the private sector, which is itself interacting with choice.  The system of “managing” user-generated web content in China follows similar logic and approach as the system for controlling professional news media.  While the survey should be improved and applied to a systematic and broader range (e.g. web service company employees), it is a helpful beginning point for additional research in China and in other countries, and has potential activist implications as well–for example, perhaps we should fund more than circumvention tools, and instead on other policies such as raising awareness to bloggers about varying censorship practices.

3.2 Hal ROBERTS & Ethan ZUCKERMAN: Circumvention Landscape Report: Methods, Tools, and Uses

Roberts and Zuckerman presented their research in the use of circumvention tools for internet filtering. 

Roberts first notes that the circumvention tools addressed here will not focus on filtering in the local-publisher level in the way that Rebecca MacKinnon addressed in her talk.  Instead, they will address circumvention on an international and IP network level, through DNS (domain name server) queries, and on content-based circumvention through keywords on the online network.  

All circumvention tools use similar mechanisms, be it processing between the user and server via a proxy (for IP and DNS filtering) or encryption (for keyword filtering).  Circumvention also has several different challenges, including ensuring performance, developing sophisticated ways of keeping the proxy themselves from getting blocked, and building trust from users of the tools. 

Roberts highlights three different models of hosting: (1) centralized hosting (e.g. UltraSurf), which has high trust; (2) p2p hosting (e.g. psiphon – although the software version has evolved since the time of testing); and (3) algorithm-based routing (e.g. Tor, also discussed in more detail in a later panel), which allows hosting more servers, but it is harder to find people on the servers.

Zuckerman then pointed to a few lessons learned based on their initial study.  First, user models proved to be a complex and underemphasized aspect of their research.  The funders of the study approached the project from the perspective of human rights activists (how can Burmese journalists stay secure as they report?), so they were looking for the most secure version of circumvention tools.  Other users, however (high school students trying to get into Facebook), have a demand for less secure tools with lower stakes.  So one weakness of the report is failing to reflect the mix of different user models for these circumvention tools.  The current six criteria are utility, usability, security, promotion, sustainability, and openness.  Zuckerman suggests that the report can be improved by including better criteria based on different circumvention needs.

One interesting finding was that the usage of single-hop proxies were increasing, and many were looking for single-hop proxies.  There were sufficient proxies to be able to sell the right to be at the top of the directory page on their proxies.  So the next round of work should be more egalitarian, looking at a much wider range of tools and proxies.

The next step in the project is to study what people are actually doing with their proxy servers by examining data from proxy servers or cyber cafes, analyzing search data for proxy servers, or conducting surveys within human rights and blogger communities.  Zuckerman and the research team plan to collect behavioral data to determine user models, and apply their analysis within those models and a new set of tools.

3.1 LIAO Han Teng: Special Speech Zones in the Chinese-Written Internet

Han-Teng Liao will be focusing on theories of user-generated content, and specifically two major cases of user-generated content: (1) Baidu, and (2) Wikipedia.  William Chang, chief scientist of Baidu, has stated in the WWW2008 conference in Beijing that there is “no reason for China to use Wikipedia.”

He first argues that the debate over freedom v. control (“zhi” v. “luan”) has been neutralized by the government to some extent. Beijing has successfully replaced control with freedom.  According to a 2007 survey, over 80% of the Chinese people prefer government control, based on the idea that freedom leads to chaos or “luna” (e.g. Tiananmen Square protests; Taiwan’s democracy and freedom that is perceived as chaotic).  

So we have reached a deadlock of sorts about these theories; Liao is therefore trying to modify the conceptual framework of control and freedom–looking at it instead as “zoning tech” v. “dynamic order.”  Free speech zones actual walls (e.g. in property zoning cases), and the government treats freedoms as exceptions. In “zoning technologies,” some free actions are allowed, but the mutual adjustment is among states, market players, and individuals.  In contrast, a dynamic order emerges from individual free actions and mutual adjustments to one another based on diverse set of principles.  Order can thus emerge from a free mutual adjustment online.  Instead of the “great firewall,” perhaps we can modify the metaphor to be a “great canal + a great dam.”

Reframing the question: How do we read the order online?  Beijing’s involvement has an impact on the dynamic order; perhaps the question is less about the dynamic order and more about the market order.  Perhaps the relationship is more divisive and less integrative.

Why Baidu Baike and Chinese Wikipedia?  Baidu is a rare and favoured-by-Beijing competitor to Wikipedia.

Panel 3: Censorship, Surveillance, and the State of the Chinese Internet

CIRC squareWe’re taking a lunch break now, but will soon be hearing from participants for our third panel:
  • Hal ROBERTS & Ethan ZUCKERMAN, Harvard University 
  • Rebecca MACKINNON, University of Hong Kong’s Journalism and Media Studies Centre 
  • Dave LYONS, Rutgers University 
  • Respondent: Carolyn MARVIN, University of Pennsylvania 
  • Moderator: Lokman TSUI, University of Pennsylvania

 

Liveblogging is scheduled to begin at 1:30pm (you can also watch the webcast live, among other ways of staying connected with the conference’s proceedings). Full biographies of panelists are also available here.

Panel 1 Q&A

Delli Carpini Q1 – Jiang Min and Sarah to respond to each other. two different pictures?

Q2 – what would take to have a systematic and more institutionlized mechanism to use the internet as freedom tools?

Q3 – Civil spaces including NGOs and SNSs, how do they involve public into collective acction?

Q4 – Yuan Le’s study. call for social change within the gov framework? awareness of political issues shown in the forums?

Hongmei Li Q5 – commercial influence on internet use in china?

Monroe Price Q6 – whether the circumstance suggests the internet is different from the press? what is the cultural and political implication of the results to put china into this non-free category, considering countries have no access so no control?

Q7 – sentences of bloggers in china? they are not jailed because of blogging but coz they are already dissidents. the left-right division? too simple categorization.

Jiang Min – deliberation defintions are different. how ppl talk about public issues in such spaces. not about decision-making. chinese ppl increasingly have economic and cultural freedom. but politically it could be quite difficult. having more debate itself is great.

Sarah – not too different. more focusing on another element. there are vivid discussions but also limitations. translating online discussion into offline mobilization is what they try to see now. malaysia is doing this coz they have less strict control over the internet. and ppl were sentenced for online activities. maybe not to say bloggers. and how to weight the obstacles to access vs content control? from a political org perspective, they weigh censorship a bit more. compared to turkey, chinese censorhip is more effective. the issue of censorship itself is sencored that ppl dont know how to go around the censorship, which is a public info in turkey.

Yuan – Left-right discourse is a new wave of cultural revolution. it might be a bit distant from young generations. but we see increasingly such discourse onine. political orientation or ideologies to support their psychological needs? they dont know exactly what left and right means. but they still lable others and use them an attack on oppponents. so the left-right lables are often seen online. this classification is useful to study such labeling behaviors at least.

Jiang Min – no press freedom in china coz nobody was allowed to have press. that could be one indicator of press freedom. collecitve action might be difficult in china if it is only political. but other types of collective action are actually welcomed by the gov such as the relief help during earthquake.

a nice exchange of opinions bt jiang and sarah.

Panel 2: Roundtable Discussion

Round Table Discussion
Sharon HOM, Human Rights in China
Leslie HARRIS, Center for Democracy and Technology
Bob BOORSTIN, Google
Ang PENG-HWA, School of Communication Studies, Nanyang Technological University
Colin MACLAY, Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard University
Isaac MAO, Co-founder of cnblog.org
Moderator: Rebecca MACKINNON, University of Hong Kong’s Journalism and Media Studies Centre

Liveblogging begins at 10:45. Also, keep an eye on Ethan Zuckerman’s blog, who is here and has marathon liveblogged many a conference.

Sharon Hom could not make it.

The Global Network Initiative is a cooperative effort between NGOs and the private sector devoted to “creating a collaborative approach to protect and advance freedom of expression and privacy in the ICT sector”.

Colin MacLay focuses on corporate responsibility, and invites us to examine the issues of free expression and privacy in terms of Lessig’s four forces (law, infrastructure, commerce and norms). The problems of censorship and freedom of expression is not a China-specific problem but a global one. Governments are all recognizing the impact of Internet users, the role companies can play in furthering government interests. The goal of the initiative is that by learning from one another in creating a code of conduct, the groups involved could collectively move forward effectively. They found that no single sector alone, investors, companies, academics or human rights groups, could make things happen and so you found competitors and opposing groups sitting together discussing these issues.

Rebecca MacKinnon asks Leslie Harris what her response is to the assertion that GNI is a fig leaf providing cover for participating companies and organizations. Harris says there is always a tension to the group given their disparate interests, but they have struck some balance and would not be participating if they believed the effort was a fig leaf. The Initiative, unlike other multi-stakeholder movements in other areas, is very much focused on government power rather than corporate behavior alone.

Harris is then asked to clarify the nature of the code of conduct, and she says it is not simply a list of what is right and wrong, but rather best practices, internal safeguards, legal guidelines, how best to enter a new market while respecting these issues. It is more a way of doing things, rather than commandments of what can or can’t be done in country X. MacLay adds that no one yet knows precisely what should be done, no static solution, and so rather they created a community, platform and approach for these problems.

MacKinnon asks Bob Boorstin what impact GNI has had on Google and its work in China. Boorstin thanks Annenberg, and also says he’s the proverbial fire hydrant at the dog show – and a “technological idiot”. Boorstin just came back from Google’s China office, but has been there a dozen times since 1979 and appreciates the changes of the past 30 years. Why would Google join GNI? First is the albatross “Don’t Be Evil”. This is a government problem – if governments didn’t ask for censorship, Google wouldn’t bother. Second, there is strength in numbers. GNI is more than the sum of its parts in terms of leverage. Third, Google wants more approaches like The Millenium Challenge under Bush. Fourth, Google is in GNI as a defensive move against critics, though many of those will give no quarter. GNI is the first time that Google has decided at an executive level to allow outsiders to come in two years and judge them. As a non-Silicon Valleyite, Boorstin emphasizes that the Valley tends to say “look at our cool product. Buy it and leave us alone”, and so this is a big step for Google.

What difference has GNI made within Google? Googlers (what employees are called) have very strong opinions, and many would have never gone to China. GNI provides a certain baseline charter by which to discuss these issues internally, and raises the volume of such discussion. GNI language has been incorporated into the employee code of conduct, another difficult step. It also helps regularize Google’s process for dealing with these issues, whether its in China, Thailand, Turkey or Italy.

Boorstin asks why are there no Asian and European members in GNI, and can it expand to other sectors beyond the Internet, such as telecoms which handed over lots of data to the Justice Department.

Isaac Mao once wrote a letter to Google criticizing some of its actions in China. He points out that China is a complex and enormous space with various actors. Google was blocked in China in 2003, before it had a China office. By 2005, the Chinese government was upgrading the filtering and monitoring systems for the Internet. As an MNC, Google has more access to government officials than most of the rest of us. At Mao’s level, he sees more administrators and Internet entrepreneurs struggling to survive when their business model clashes with government restrictions. When doing business in China, Mao has three suggestions. First, when Google was first blocked, Internet users protested and this is even more true now when you could say there is an “Internet Republic of Caonima”. You need to interact more with Internet users. Second, they ought to find better, more creative solutions to satisfy both users and the government – a savvier middle ground. Third, he suggests that Google increase Adsense payments to Chinese bloggers to increase revenue and profile.

In response, Boorstin agrees that it would be great if Google could find more ways to deliver regular services (as found outside China). Google has promised never to have a “Shi Tao” moment. Second, Boorstin asks “how can a U.S. company compete with a Chinese company (in China)?”

MacKinnon asks Ang Peng-Hwa about criticisms that there is no Asian participation in this all-Westerner endeavor, and whether it can be truly global?

Ang: Yes.

GNI is not about what companies must do. What can be done in the U.S. can’t be done in Singapore. Trade is vital to Singapore, being 160% of GDP, so it works differently. So GNI is about process, which produces different results in different countries. You can’t publish Mein Kampf in Germany or step on a coin (with the King’s face) in Thailand, and no set of static rules (as mentioned by MacLay) can encompass this. Ang doesn’t see global censorship, but rather the Internet maturing and the realization that online and offline media function differently, like rules for riding horses would be inappropriate for the car at the turn of the 20th century.

When China censors, it has a strategic aim to support Chinese business, such as undermining Google to strengthen Baidu, says Ang. GNI does not seem appropriate for small business. He suggests that for some of Boorstin’s problems, such as the lawsuit in Italy involving YouTube, laws must be made to address third party liability (or lack thereof).

Colin MacLay points out that GNI is based on various international standards such as the Declaration of Human Rights and related covenants, and is not based only on U.S.-centric laws or platforms. Also, government can be bad, but also be confused and simply do things badly. Do we think we should be regulating the Internet as media, or as expression? Do we need to have a debate on this? Media regulation and human rights seem to be converging (along with privacy and transparency). And yes, there are no small companies in GNI and there should be.

MacKinnon calls on Michael Anti in the audience for a personal experience on blog censorship, as his MSNSpaces blog was shut down in 2005 and he spoke to Congress saying Chinese Internet users are not a doll for Westerners to dress however they want. Anti says that Google products such as Gmail and Google Groups are really vital to those who seek free and secure tools for civil society. Anti feels that Google and other large companies should have a social contract with civil society netizens, where netizens accept Google’s cooperation with the government and Google provides as many tools as possible to them. Boorstin, boringly, agrees. He also points out that Google has a program to give Adwords away for free to NGOs in different countries, including China.

Professor Michael Price asks if Congress has been involved, and other forms of approach. Second, he asks “what is the jurisprudence of the figleaf? What is their function? What is the positive side? They cover what we know is there. We should explore the function of figleafs.” Hilarity ensues.

Leslie Harris explains that GNI has not taken hold in Europe, where these are not seen as problems, while in America it has focused companies attention on the U.S. government, which has also increased the impression that this is a U.S. plan.

Ang Peng-Hwa brings up the movie Red Cliff II, that the generals can’t tell the prime minister about a problem because he’s busy with a woman. In the book, the prime minister is singing, asks an advisors frank opinion and chops off his head when his truthful opinion displeases him. Then the generals approach him – what would you say? Boorstin thinks Chinese netizens know whats under the figleaf and have no illusions.

Isaac Mao is asked what he would do if he ran GNI. He says that an Asian regional group could be formed, as many of these cultures are accustomed to being more controlled, and could find more common ground. But he feels that this should come after a global, universal framework, which could help especially in a country on the scale of China. Ang Peng-Hwa agrees about localization, and wants to start a Singaporean EFF called Committee of IT Experts, because you can’t use the word “freedom” in Singapore without being misunderstood. The stronger the censorship, the weaker the civil society, and so in Asia civil society is unlikely to create such a group.

Li Hongmei asks about skepticism that companies can balance profit-seeking and social responsibility, and why does Boorstin and others think Internet companies can do this while others cannot, especially given the reputation of Chinese companies such as Sanlu?

Boorstin hates the term “social responsibility” because it puts CSR aside and doesn’t integrate it into daily work. MacLay adds that it should not be about “do-gooding”, but about good practices. Boorstin points out that GE pitched its push for green tech as being about making money, not doing good, and that is more realistic, believable and effective.

Prof Joseph Cappella: responses to the papers

Prof Cappella has worked on the deliberation projects for more than 10 years. A US-oriented perspective.

1. quite heavy usage of ICTs for social and political purpose in china. infrastructure allows it. there is a developing trend that is oriented to particular ideologies and views. cross-space, cross- bbs differences. the diversity is under control though. the diversity is thus un-representative. offline, off-record, coded way to express opinions. – what are the next set of qs? builkalization ppl with similar minds to go to similar websites. what are the consequences of this with regard to changing opinions, political participation, and govnance? how effective are the limits and the tricks to get around this?

2. self-selection to congenial and uncongenial sites. internet is niche-oriented by partisan lines in the us. talia jomini’s dissertation on partisan selective exposure to info.

3. if ppl choose uncongenial media, would they find the info unacceptable to them? individual bias towards disagreeing videos. lauren feldman’s dissertation on exposure to opinionated media content.

4. vince price and cappella’s deliberation study. ppl’s own opinions become more sophisticated after deliberation, more knowledgable about others’ opinions.

5. what are the macro-mechanisms that keep diversity away from the public dialogue? how the limitation is effective in restricting opinion expression.

Karin KARLEKAR and Sarah COOK: Global Internet Freedom Indicators: Chinese censorship in a comparative context

Jack Qiu mentiones that CIRC’s first session is often macro-scope.

Sarah presents 15 countries not just china.

2007-2008 research period.

questions: what are the main threats to internent and digitla media freedom today? techs used by gov to control. is china less free?

internet and mobile phones are both considered. gov and non-gov actors are included. 19 indicators and 3 thematic categories were made up – obstacles to access, infrastructure and policy; limits on content, censorship; violations of users rights, legal environment such as privacy.

what found – paradox is that growing access while growing threats.

key finding in china – penetration doubled in last two years but also sophistiacted and multi-layered control apparatus. 78 out of 100 on the score, higher score worse freedom, not free. strong performance on access, hight interference with content, signiciant violation of users rights.

china in comparison – cuba worst because of bad access.

highlighted examples – strong infrastructure but gov-imposed network and regulatory restrictions; compared to brazil, egypt, malaysia vs. india and south africa.

multi-layered censorship: tech filtering, prepublication, postpublication, proactive manipulation. – detail and sophistication of directives; 50 cents party, paid by gov to post pro-gov opinions online (russia and tunisia are doing this too).

sentences in china were longest although 1 of 6 countries does sentence blogger. three years to ten years.

pushback factors – some circumvention, incredible dynamism, public vs. hidden/offline, comparision to cuba where conversations are within the intranet emails.

internet vs. press freedom – there is a differentiation. for the non-free countries, the difference is very small. in the partly free countries such as turkey, malaysia and russia, the difference is bigger. (interesting findings!)

closing thought – more likely tha not that chinese authorities will continue to actively contest the unfettered use of the internet. how can defenders of internet freedom ensure the forces for openness prevail over the controllers – in china and beyond?